Meanings are acquired from
experiencing differences against a background of sameness,
rather than from experiencing sameness against a
background of difference: Putting a conjecture to the test
by embedding it in a pedagogical tool
Ference Martona, Ming Fai
Pangb
aUniversity of Gothenburg, Sweden
bThe University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
SAR, China
Article received 26 March 2013
/ revised 31 May 2013 / accepted 30 June 2013 / available
online 27 August 2013
Abstract
In
helping learners to make a novel meaning their own, such as
when helping children to understand what a word means or
teaching students a new concept in school, we frequently
point to examples that share the aimed-at meaning but differ
otherwise. This type of approach rests on the assumption
that novel meanings can be acquired through the experience
of sameness against a background of difference. This paper
argues that this assumption is unfounded and that the
opposite is the case: we make novel meanings our own through
the experience of differences against a background of
sameness. We put this conjecture to the test in an
experimental study by embedding it in a computer game and
the results support the conjecture.
.
Keywords: Variation Theory; Phenomenography;
Discernment; Critical Experiment
Corresponding
author: Ming Fai Pang, The University of Hong
Kong, pangmf@hku.hk, T (852) 28592428, F (852) 28585649
http://dx.doi.org/10.14786/flr.v1i1.16
This
paper is about a conjecture and how it is put to the test.
The conjecture is actually the title of the paper and we
first briefly
describe the theory that elaborates its implications,
together with some previous results. After that we report on
a study which is meant to be a critical test of it. We call this
conjecture—and the system of corollaries that it
implies—somewhat immodestly the Variation
Theory (of
Learning) (Marton, forthcoming; Marton
& Tsui,
2004).
1.1 The
origin of meaning
It
is commonly believed that a child - or
an adult for that matter - can
learn the meaning of a word by observing a number of
examples of what the word refers to, that share this meaning
but differ in other ways. For example, we point to a dog and
say dog,
point to another dog and say dog,
point to a third dog and say dog, and
then expect the child to understand what the word “dog”
means (refers to), i.e., a certain kind of animal. In
an experimental context such a learning event could look
like the following: “…children might be shown a red fuzzy
triangle labeled “wug”, a blue bumpy triangle labeled “wug”,
a green scratchy triangle labeled “wug” and then at the test
be asked to pick out a “wug” (a yellow squishy triangle)
among two or three objects” (Vlach
et al, 2008). Now, if a child has noticed previously that
there are different geometric forms of which triangle is
one, it is most likely that she will see that the three
things are different, but they are all triangles regardless
if she has learned that they are
called “triangle”. Hence she will identify the yellow
squishy triangle in the test as a “wug”.
But if she has never noticed triangles previously, or geometric
forms in general, she will not see any triangles at all. In consequence,
she will not be able to see what the different cases have in
common. There
is no way of learning the idea of triangle in such an
experimental context, if you have not come
across that idea earlier. But if you have, you might be able
to learn that triangles
are called “wug” in the actual context. In the
same way, no child can learn that dogs are a kind of
animals, without coming across other animals than dogs. The
idea of triangle derives from how it differs from other
geometric forms, and the idea of dog derives from how it
differs from other animals.
Providing
different examples of the same thing is not only the most
common method of helping young children to build a
vocabulary, but probably also the most common method of
teaching concepts, principles, and problem-solving methods
in school. Stigler andHiebert (1999) describe
such an approach as the typical way of teaching mathematics
in U.S. schools, and the highly authoritative volume How People
Learn urges
teachers to provide “…many examples in which the same
concept is at work.” (Bransford,
Brown, & Cocking, 2000, p 20)
Looking
at cases that are the same in one respect but differ in
others to determine what they have in common is called
induction. According to Fodor (1980), this is the only idea
that exists to explain how novel
meanings (concepts) are learned, and it simply does not
work, for the reasons already cited. It follows then that
there is no explanation of how we learn, find, create, or
appropriate new meanings. Hence, by default, Fodor concludes
that meanings (concepts) are innate. In our view, however,
even if the concept (meaning) of “dog” were innate, you
would never be able to separate that meaning from the
meaning of “animal” if you had never encountered any animals
other than dogs. Regardless of whether dogs were then called dogs or animals,
the meaning of “dog” would be exactly the same as the
meaning of “animal.” Hence, you still would not have
acquired the meaning of “dog.” Nor of “animal” for that
matter. The
meaning of dog has to be learned, and this happens by coming
across dogs, as well as other animals.
Similarly,
if we lived in an entirely green world, then we would be
unable to notice the greenness of everything. Hence, whether
or not concepts (meanings) are innate, we must encounter
alternatives to them if we are to be able to notice and
grasp these concepts. Awareness of a particular number
presupposes awareness of other numbers (or at least one
other number), and awareness of a particular color
presupposes awareness of other colors (or at least one other
color). You cannot possibly understand what Chinese is
simply by listening to different people speaking Chinese if
you have never heard another language, and you cannot
possibly understand what virtue is by inspecting different
examples of the same degree of virtue. Nor can you
understand what a “linear equation” is by looking only at
linear equations.
You
cannot arrive at a novel meaning through induction,
but you can through contrast.
In induction, the focused meaning, i.e., the one that you
are trying to help another to make his or her own (e.g.
“Chinese”) is kept invariant, while the other features of
the same entity (e.g. words)
vary. In contrast,
it is just the other way around. The
focused meaning (e.g. language)
varies, while other features (e.g. words) are
invariant. Instead of saying different words in the same
language (Chinese), you say the same word in different
languages (one of which is Chinese).
Inductive learning is a frequent
research topic, not the least in the field of machine
learning (e.g. Michalski, 1983). As the conjecture being put
to the test in our study is about how novel meanings are
acquired, and as it states that they are not acquired
through induction, we will leave those studies aside here.
1.2 Earlier
attempts to put the conjecture to the test
Most
work on Variation Theory has been carried out in the form of
Learning Studies, the inspiration for which is the Japanese
Lesson Study, which came to wider attention through the
publication of Stigler and Hiebert’s (1999)
best-selling book The
Teaching Gap. In this type of study, a group of
teachers teaching a particular subject at a particular level
together choose an object of learning (something to be
learned) that is vitally important for students’ continued
learning and that has earlier been found to present
difficulties for them. The teachers plan a lesson together,
and one of them carries it out - usually
in his or her own class - while
the others observe. Afterwards, the group analyzes and
discusses what happened in the classroom. The Learning Study
is a hybrid form of Lesson Study and Design Experiment. It
is a theory-based research undertaking whose important
components include exploration of students’ ways of making
sense of the object of learning before and after the
lesson(s). A Learning Study usually comprises three cycles,
each building on the conclusions of the previous. Finally, a
Learning Study is documented, frequently in publishable
form. While Lesson study is primarily an arrangement for
in-service training of the participating teachers, Learning study
is primarily teachers’ research, the results of which are
supposed to be widely shared with
other teachers. The Variation Theory of Learning has so far
been the theoretical point of departure for the studies
carried out. The model was originally developed right after
the turn of the millennium in Hong Kong, and subsequently
spread to other countries, notably to Sweden. Our estimate
is that nearly 1000 such studies have been carried out by
now (cf. Lo, 2009).
The
main (quantitative) results of the studies published to date
can be summarized as follows.
- In
nearly all of the studies, students’ results were better
after the lesson(s) than before (Lo, Pong, & Chik, 2005).
(Although this may appear self-evident, it is not.
Unfortunately, there are many school lessons in which
students learn nothing, or at least not what the teacher had
hoped they would.)
- Students
with weaker learning prerequisites usually learn the most.
Hence, not only does the average rise, but the spread
diminishes (Lo et al., 2005).
- In
cases in which what the students had learned was observed
not only immediately after the lesson but also on a later
occasion, the results were often found to be better at the
later time (thus indicating a content-specific “learning to
learn” effect) (Holmqvist, Gustavsson & Wernberg, 2008).
- Results
on national achievement tests increased for classes that had
participated in several Learning Studies, an effect that in
all likelihood was mediated by changes in teachers’ regular
ways of teaching (Maanula, 2011).
- When
the same object of learning is dealt with in a Learning
Study and in a Lesson Study by groups of equally
well-qualified teachers, the quality of learning turns out
to be strikingly higher in the former (Marton & Pang,
2006, 2008; Pang,
2010; Pang
& Marton,
2003, 2005, 2007).
- When
the three cycles of a Learning Study are compared, the
results from the third are usually better than those from
the second, and those from the second are usually better
than those from the first (Lo, 2009).
John Elliot, one of the
founders of the “action research” movement in education, has
evaluated two large-scale Learning Study projects carried
out in Hong Kong. He concluded:
“The
evaluation gathered convincing evidence of the positive
impact of the process on teachers’ and students’ learning …. Learning
Study is focused on realizing new kinds of pedagogical
roles. From the evidence gathered in this evaluation it has
enormous potential in this respect”. (Elliott,
2004)
It seems, in other words, that the Learning Study approach
has been something of a success story. What about our
conjecture? Has it been supported in Learning Study
research?
In
our Learning Studies, every lesson was initially planned to
be consistent with Variation Theory, and hence consistent
with our conjecture. Differences between cycles were related
to differences between different interpretations of the same
ideas. Although this approach may be a good way to improve
lessons, it is not really suitable for testing a theoretical
conjecture. Accordingly, we carried out a few studies using
comparison groups, controlling for the assumed generally
positive effects of the co-operative Lesson Study model. Two
groups of teachers, randomly selected for the two conditions
(i.e., a Learning Study and Lesson Study condition), agreed
on a particular object of learning. Together, they explored
their students’ understanding of that object, and planned a
lesson on the basis of what they found and on their previous
experience of teaching the same object of learning. One of
the teachers then carried out the lesson, while the others
observed. After the lesson, the group again explored
students’ understanding of the object of learning, and the
lesson was analyzed in light of the results.
A
researcher was present as a resource person during both the
discussions and lessons. The only difference between the two
conditions was that in the Learning Study group, the
researcher introduced Variation Theory, which he did not do
in the Lesson Study group. Although he participated in the
discussions in both groups, he tried to act in a reactive
rather than active (initiating) manner. The focus of the
studies was a comparison of students’ results under the two
conditions in relation to a comparison of the patterns of
variation and invariance brought about in those conditions (Marton
& Pang,
2006, 2008; Pang
& Marton,
2003, 2005,
2007). Although
the results showed dramatic differences to the advantage of
the Learning Study (and hence the theory on which it is
based, as these patterns were controlled by the teachers -
and by the students, of course - these comparisons had to be post hoc. To
sharpen the comparison of patterns of variation and
invariance, the researcher must be able to ascertain exactly
what patterns are being compared. In quasi-experimental
comparisons, such as that described here, there are usually
no consecutive cycles. Even if a researcher tries to be as
blind to the two conditions as possible, we can hardly claim
that he or she has succeeded completely. In our case, the
“theory group” may have had an advantage beyond that
originating in the theory itself. Furthermore, the
comparisons were made between the conditions in terms of the
patterns of variation and invariance observed by the
researcher, which means that they were post hoc,
as noted, and hence the matter of empirical support for
Variation Theory is not entirely straightforward.
1.3 There
are no teaching experiments
A
fair number of studies have been published in recent years
in which the outcomes of learning have been found to be
systematically related to the patterns of variation and
invariance inherent in the conditions of learning. The lived
object of learning (learning outcome) in these studies has
generally been found to be related to the enacted object of
learning (teaching and classroom interaction) in ways
entirely consistent with our conjecture. The outcomes of
learning, and differences therein, can be made sense of in
terms of the patterns of variation and invariance or the
differences in these patterns that are inherent in the
conditions of learning (see, for instance, Fraser, Allison,
Coombes, Case, & Linder, 2006; Fraser & Linder,
2009; Linder,
Fraser & Pang, 2006; Marton
& Pang,
2006, 2008; Pang,
Linder & Fraser,
2006; Pang & Lo, 2012; Pang
& Marton, 2003, 2005,
2013).
If lessons are to provide stronger
evidence, then they must be defined in advance, and their
effects on learning must also be predicted in advance.
Kullberg (2010) carried out an interesting study in which
she instructed teachers to teach particular objects of
learning in terms of the critical features identified and
patterns of variation and invariance employed in previous
successful studies. The teachers were familiar with
Variation Theory, according to which critical features and
patterns of variation and invariance are powerful tools for
communicating ways of handling a certain object of learning.
Even when Kullberg’s (2010) results supported her
expectations, however, there were several cases in which the
enacted pattern of variation and invariance differed from
that expected. Although in some cases, the teacher had
failed to open up dimensions
1.4 A
critical experiment
The
only possible way to ensure that what is being compared is
what we want it to be seems to be to build a pattern of
variation and invariance into pedagogical tools: texts,
tasks, examples, illustrations, problems, and the like.
Variation and invariance - as far as the conditions of
learning are concerned - can then be defined in terms of the
relationships between the constituent parts of the
pedagogical tools that are used. A study of this kind was
carried out by Ki
and Marton (2003). They
investigated how non-native speakers of Cantonese could be
helped to learn to attend to both the tonal and segmental
(the sound but not the tone) aspects of Cantonese words
simultaneously to identify their meanings. Cantonese is a
tonal language in which the distinctions between six tones
are of vital importance. The difficulty that speakers of
non-tonal languages have when they try to learn it is not so
much their inability to distinguish between two juxtaposed
tones (Stagray & Downs, 1993) as their inability to link
variation in pitch at the word level to variation in word
meanings. Variation in pitch exists in all languages, but
its significance in non-tonal languages is at the sentence-
rather than word-level. Learning to pay attention to
differences in pitch at the word level as a cue to
differences in word meanings requires reorganization of the
attentional field. Ki
and Marton (2003) employed
a set of nine words grouped in two ways. In the first, they
were grouped to constitute three triplets, each
characterized by one tone (the same within each triplet, but
differing from the other two). In the second, three segments were grouped to
constitute three triplets, each characterized by one segment
and three different tones (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Three
triplets characterized by one segment and three different
tones (if read by column) and by one tone and three
different segments (if read by
rows). (see pdf file)
The
participants’ task was to learn to identify the meaning of
the word they heard by selecting its English equivalent. If
we consider each triplet as a sub-task, then to be able to
come up with the meaning of
The
two ways of grouping the words can be seen as a comparison
between two patterns of variation and invariance, that is,
as induction and contrast from the point of view of tones.
If we believe that language learners learn tones (i.e.,
differentiate between them) best if we offer them different
examples of the same tone, then we group words into
triplets, within which each has the same tone but a
different segment, and ask learners to compare them. If we
believe instead - as our conjecture suggests - that meaning
(in this case, “the meaning of tones”) derives from
variation, then we group the words into triplets, within
which the tones differ but the segment is the same, and ask
learners to compare them. In Ki
and Marton’s (2003) study,
the participants clearly learned to distinguish words more
effectively by means of tones in the condition in which the
tones were varied during the lesson and the segment remained
the same, than in the condition in which the tone was
invariant and the segments varied. The study thus demonstrated
that learning is more effective under the contrast condition
than under the induction condition, as predicted by our main
conjecture (see also Guo
& Pang,
2011). This
was the first critical experiment in which it was put to the
test.
1.5 Another
way of putting the conjecture to the test
Above,
we have argued - in agreement with Fodor (1978, 1980) - that
induction is the most common means of trying to help others
to acquire novel meanings, but it is certainly not the only
one. In our own studies of the teaching and learning of
Economics (Pang
& Marton,
2003, 2005; Marton
& Pang,
2006, 2008), we found that teachers frequently used neither
induction, nor contrast. They differed from the teachers
using Variation Theory by not only varying the focused
aspect but also varying the unfocused aspect. The teachers not using Variation
Theory actually used more variation than
the teachers using Variation Theory.
The
comparison between induction and contrast mentioned above
and being the first critical test of the conjecture, can be
illustrated in the following form:
In
relation to the tone learning experiment described in the
previous section, induction means that the participants
learn one tone at a time in three different runs. In each
run the tone is the same in every task, while the segments
(the unfocused aspect) vary. In the case of contrast, there
are three runs too, but in each run the segment is
the same in every task, while the tone (the focused aspect)
varies.
This is one way of putting the conjecture to the test.
Contrast is aligned to the theory, induction is not. But
what if the object of learning is Cantonese words (and not
only tones)? Then we have two focused aspects (tonal
and segmental). According to the theory, they should vary
one at a time. But there is a third aspect, not new for the
learners, hence unfocused. This is the meaning aspect of the
words represented by pictures and English words in the
experiment. It is not independent from the other two
aspects: When one or both vary, the meaning varies too. The
second way of putting the conjecture to the test is to
compare the case when the two focused aspects vary one at a
time, followed by both varying simultaneously (to bring the
different aspects of the words together), with the case of
having the focused aspects varying simultaneously
This
is exactly the comparison that Ki,
Ahlberg and Marton (2006)
carried out (see Figure 2), demonstrating that the
participants in the condition that was consistent with the
main conjecture learned better than those in the condition
that was not. Moreover, the conjecture was built into the
pedagogical tools they used in the study, a
computer-administered program that afforded variation,
invariance, and feedback to the participants. In the first
experiment, one of the aspects, tone, was considered focused
(what is to be learned) and the other, segment,
was considered unfocused. In this second critical experiment
in which the conjecture was put to the test, both aspects
were considered focused (they had to be learned).
tone segment meaning tone segment meaning
v i v v v v
i v v v v v
v v v v v v
Figure
2. Comparing
patterns of variation and invariance consistent with (left)
and not consistent with (right) the conjecture. (see pdf
file)
Discerning
an aspect amounts to separating it from other aspects. Two
aspects can be distinguished from each other if one varies
and the other is invariant. Furthermore, if there are two
focused aspects that learners are expected to learn to
discern, then they should be varied one at a time, rather
than simultaneously. If we want these learners to relate the
two aspects, then we should vary them simultaneously, but
only after they have been discerned. In the second
experiment carried out by Ki,
Ahlberg and Marton (2006),
there was a third aspect, meaning, that was assumed to be
recognized by the learners (they were expected to make sense
of the pictures representing the meanings). This aspect is a
function of the other two aspects and cannot be kept
invariant when any of the other aspects vary; nor does it
interfere with the experience of variation in the other
aspects, of which it is a function. The
first critical experiment showed that letting the focused
aspect (that which is to be learned) vary, while keeping the
unfocused aspect (that which has already been learned) invariant
yields better learning than keeping the focused aspect
invariant and letting the unfocused aspect vary. The
conjecture was thus supported.
In the second critical experiment it was shown that in the
case of two focused aspects varying
one at a time, and then varying both simultaneously, yields
better learning than letting both focused aspects vary from
the beginning, even when an unfocused aspect, which is a
function of the two focused aspects varies at the same time.
The conjecture was supported again. It
was put to the test in a third critical experiment in a
study reported in the next section. In this case, in
addition to the two focused aspects (demand and supply) and
the unfocused aspect being a function of the two (price),
there was an additional unfocused aspect involved (good)
independent of the two focused aspects which -
according to the theory -
was supposed to remain invariant. Again, two patterns of
variation and invariance - one consistent with, and one not
consistent with our main conjecture - were
compared in terms of their effect on learning. And the
conjecture was supported once again. This is the empirical
contribution of the present paper.
2. The study
2.1 Understanding
pricing
The
point of departure for this study was an earlier study in
which 10-year-old children were taught to discern price as a
function of demand and supply (Lo,
Lo-Fu, Chik & Pang,
2005). That study, in turn, built on an earlier study
of qualitatively different
ways of understanding price
and pricing
(Dahlgren, 1978). In both of these studies, with minor
differences, it was found that most children - and many
adults - see price as a function of the attributes of goods.
For instance, if something is expensive, then it is because
it is big, beautiful, tastes good, etc. Price is thus seen
as an attribute of the good in question, and linked to its
other attributes, not as a function of market conditions
(notably demand and supply), as economics tells us that it
is. Some see price as a function of demand only, and others
as a function only of supply. For others still, price is a
function of both demand and supply, or rather of the
relationship between the two, which is roughly in accordance
with the canonical conceptualization of price in classical,
liberal economics. We use the expression “learning to see
something in a certain way” as synonymous with “making a
novel meaning your own” or “appropriating a meaning.” All
three refer to the capability to discern certain aspects of
a phenomenon and focus on them simultaneously.
What
then are “ways of seeing something”? They are categories of
description used to depict the various appearances of
something or the different ways in which it is experienced
(or its different meanings). The research specialization of phenomenography(Marton,
1981; Marton
& Booth,
1997; Marton
& Pang,
2008) is the study of categories of description depicting
appearances, experiences, and meanings. It posits that if a
learner exhibits a certain way of seeing something, then
this does not imply that he or she hasthat
way of seeing (as a mental representation, for instance).
What then does it imply? It implies that he or she is seeing
- or has seen - a particular phenomenon in a particular way
under particular circumstances. Further, the fact that he or
she is so seeing implies that he or she is able - or
has been able - to
see that particular phenomenon in that particular way under
the given particular circumstances. Accordingly, what we
might wish to explore is the extent to which the same person
can see the same phenomenon in the same way under different
circumstances. If he or she can, then this could be
interpreted as demonstrating that he or she has separated
the particular way of seeing this particular phenomenon from
the particular circumstances. Becoming an “expert”
frequently amounts to being able to see particular phenomena
in particular ways under widely varying circumstances (cf.
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Goodwin, 1994; Marton
& Booth,
1997, p. x; Sandberg, 1994).
Hence, phenomenography does not tell
you what individuals’ ways of seeing something are. It tells you how their ways of
seeing something vary (between people
under the same circumstances and/or within people under
different circumstances). The different categories of
description together constitute the outcome
space (of
how the particular phenomenon might be experienced). As
previously mentioned, studies have established four
categories of description that together constitute the outcome
space of
the experience of price.
2.2 Making
it possible to learn to see price in a more powerful way
Are
the different ways of seeing price equally powerful? We do
not believe that we can always - or even most of the time -
find a universal ordering of how valid and powerful
different ways of seeing the same thing are. In a planned
economy, and according to Marxist economics, for example,
price is not a function of
demand and supply. However, we can delimit a set of contexts
and settle for ordering the different options within that
set. We could thus argue that it is better to enable
learners to see something in an additional way that we
believe to be powerful - in certain contexts, that is - than
not doing so.
Accordingly,
we may try to help learners to see something in a new way,
that is, in a way that they have previously been unable to.
Although we can certainly try, we can never be certain of
success. At best, we can ascertain that this new way of
seeing mighthave
been instilled, that is, that under the conditions
given, it is possible that the learners
learned to discern certain critical features, which is
exactly what Lo
et al. (2005)
did in five primary school classes (Grade 4) in Hong Kong in
the context of a Learning Study. The aim of each lesson in
this study was the same: to enable the students to see price
as a function of demand and supply in novel situations.
After the lesson, a novel question was used to probe their
way of seeing price.
2.3 The
enacted object of learning
A
double-lesson was used to help the students to learn to
discern demand and supply, and the relationship between the
two, as determinants of price. During the lesson, the
students formed groups and participated in an auction of
four items (a mechanical dinosaur, a doll, a dinosaur card,
and a stationery set). The auction was repeated several
times, with variations. To encourage the students to focus
on and discern the critical aspects of supply and demand
separately, changes were made in supply (by varying the
number of items available) while demand was kept invariant,
and then changes were made in demand (by varying the
purchasing power through changes in the
auction money afforded the groups) while supply was kept
invariant. After each auction, they were asked what would be
a reasonable price for a new, limited-edition mechanical
dinosaur if people had more money to spend. After the groups
had written their answers on a worksheet, the teacher
engaged the class in a discussion of the case of supply
going down and demand going up.
Did
the teachers who took part in this study achieve their goal?
If so, to what extent did they do so? As can be seen from
Table 1, their attempts were not especially successful, with
the possible exception of class 4B (see the frequencies for
category D, considered the canonical conception here).
Table 1
Distribution of conceptions in pre- and
post-tests in Learning Study carried out by Lo
et al. (2005)
|
Class 4A |
Class 4B |
Class 4C |
Class 4D |
Class 4E |
|||||
Conceptions of price |
Pre-test |
Post-test |
Pre-test |
Post-test |
Pre-test |
Post-test |
Pre-test |
Post-test |
Pre-test |
Post-test |
A. Attributes of the good |
6.1% |
15.2% |
7.7% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
9.7% |
17.9% |
0.0% |
6.5% |
9.7% |
B. Demand |
39.4% |
45.5% |
64.0% |
28.2% |
77.5% |
71.0% |
50.0% |
78.6% |
51.5% |
48.4% |
C. Supply |
0.0% |
6.0% |
2.6% |
7.7% |
3.2% |
3.2% |
10.7% |
3.6% |
19.4% |
6.5% |
D. Demand and supply |
3.0% |
9.1% |
10.3% |
61.5% |
3.2% |
12.9% |
7.1% |
14.2% |
9.7% |
22.6% |
E. Other non-economic reasons |
3.0% |
0.0% |
7.7% |
2.6% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
3.6% |
0.0% |
3.2% |
0.0% |
Unclassified |
48.5% |
24.2% |
7.7% |
0.0% |
16.1% |
3.2% |
10.7% |
3.6% |
9.7% |
12.8% |
Rather
than ask whether (and why or why not) seeing price in terms
of demand and supply is too difficult for 10-year-old
children, we are more eager to understand the striking
difference in results between
demand supply meaning good demand supply meaning good
v i v i v i v v
i v v i i v v v
v v v i v v v v
Figure 3. Comparing
patterns of variation and invariance, consistent (left) and
not consistent (right) with the conjecture.
2.4 Design
of the study
To
reduce the number of factors that could affect the outcome,
we tried to build the pattern of variation and invariance
(which we assumed to be necessary) into the task structure
of the learning resources in such a way that the entire
experiment would be an interaction between students and the
auction game tool: the computer. Students were invited to
attempt to achieve the object of learning by using two
different computerized learning resources during an
independent learning session that lasted approximately one
and a half hours and was held in the multi-media learning
center of the participating school. In line with Lo
et al. (2005)
study, in both learning resources, the economic principle to
be dealt with was the determination of the market price
through the interaction of supply and demand. An auction
game was used to embody the variation in the dimensions of
supply and demand. To test whether it is crucial to keep the
auction item in question invariant, so as to enable students
to focus on and discern the critical aspect of the
interaction between supply and demand more readily and
effectively, the two learning resources were identical in
all respects but: one resource made use of the same product
(i.e., boxes of candy) throughout the auction game, whereas
the other featured different products within and across each
round.
Seventy-eight
Grade 4 students from four classes of one school in Hong
Kong participated in the study. Within each class, students
were randomly divided into two groups, with each given one
of the two learning resources. To minimize the teacher
effect, learning took place in an autonomous manner, with
the students involved playing the computerized auction game
on their own, although the researcher gave a five-minute
summary at the end of the session to remind the students of
the key learning points. (Note that it was impossible for
the researcher to know under which condition each student
was working. The only difference between the two conditions
was that students in the same multi-media learning center
received one or the other of the two versions of the
learning resource, with the distribution of the two
completely randomized.)
To
obtain students’ existing understanding of the object of
learning before they engaged with the learning resources and
to form a baseline for comparison of the learning outcomes
of the two groups, a pre-test was administered to all
students. Then, immediatelyafter
the independent learning session, they were required to
complete a post-test to allow evaluation of their mastery of
the object of learning.
In
both tests, the students
were asked to consider
a problem relating to a real-life scenario embodying the
principle in question, i.e., the interaction of supply and
demand in determining the market price of a good. They were also
asked to elaborate upon
the factors they
had considered in setting that price. The questions in the
pre- and post-tests
were essentially identical, except that the product in
question varied. Mirroring Lo
et al. (2005)
study, a hot dog and a box of biscuits were used. Students
who were asked a question about the hot dog in the pre-test
were asked about a box of biscuits in the post-test, and
vice versa. The pre- and post-test questions were as
follows: Have
you ever tried the hot dogs (biscuits) sold in the school
shop? Do you know how much they cost? Maybe you know or
you don’t know. Anyway, just for your information, hot
dogs are (a box of biscuits is) now sold at HK$5. Suppose
that you are the new owner of the shop. What price would
you set for a hot dog (box of biscuits)? Would you set the
current price, or a different price? What would you
consider when you set the price?
The
students’ answers were analyzed and described in terms of
the aforementioned set of four categories of understanding.
2.5 The
learning resources
To
build a relevance structure (Marton
& Booth,
1997, p. 143) that would enable students to appropriate the
object of learning, they were given the task of bidding on
goods for an upcoming New Year’s celebration through the
computerized auction game. In the first round, students were
introduced to the basic rules and operation of the game.
Each student was given HK$400 in auction money and asked to
bid for and thus try to obtain as many items as possible
from the nine being auctioned, which were displayed on
screen with their base prices shown. Each round of the
auction came to an end after three minutes or once the
student had used up all of his or her money, whichever came
first. The average prices of the goods auctioned were then
calculated and shown to the student so that he or she could
associate possible changes in those prices with changes in
the conditions of each round of the auction, such as the
amount of auction money provided, the number of goods to be
auctioned, or both.
As
previously noted, the only difference between the two
learning resources was that for the “different goods” group
the nine items, which included different kinds of snacks
such as potato chips, chocolate bars, biscuits, and so on,
differed both within each round and between rounds, whereas
for the “same goods” group the nine items were all the same,
i.e., every item was a box of candy.
In
the second round (see Figures 4 and
5), to bring students’ focal awareness to bear upon the
dimension of demand, demand was deliberately varied (by
varying students’ purchasing power by changing the amount of
auction money they were given) while the supply of goods was
kept invariant. Each student’s auction money was cut by
HK$200, thus diminishing their purchasing power and demand
for goods. The supply of goods for auction, however,
remained invariant, with the number of items kept at nine.
Everything was identical for both learning resources except
that the nine items for auction remained invariant in the
“same goods” design (the same nine boxes of candy as in the
first round, whereas the type of goods varied in the
“different goods” design, changing from the nine kinds of
snacks in the first round to nine kinds of soft drink in the
second.)
Figure 4. Same
goods design (round 2). (see pdf file)
In the
third round, to help students to shift their focal awareness
to the dimension of supply, supply was deliberately varied
while demand was kept invariant. The number of items for
auction was reduced from nine to seven, whereas the amount
of auction money remained the same (HK$200). However, the
only - but critical - difference between the two learning
resources was that all seven items in the “same goods”
design remained boxes of candy, whereas the seven items used
in the “different goods” design now differed from those in
the two previous rounds, with participants being asked to
consider different kinds of balls in this round.
Unlike
the classroom study carried out by Lo
et al. (2005),
we introduced a fourth auction round in which variation
was introduced in both the demand and supply of goods in a
simultaneous manner. Our purpose was to help students to
focus on the dimensions of both in determining the market
price of a good. To this end, the auction money given to
students was increased from HK$200 to HK$400, and the number
of items to be auctioned was reduced from seven to six. This
round thus involved a simultaneous variation in the supply
of goods and variation in purchasing power (demand for the
goods), the aim of which was to enable students to discern
the critical aspects of experiencing price and pricing. As
before, the only difference between the two learning
resources was that the six items in the “same goods” design
remained the same, whereas a new set of items (six different
kinds of decorations) was introduced in the “different
goods” design.
Lastly,
similar to the procedure in the earlier study Lo
et al. (2005),
students were asked a question (for instructional purposes)
about what would happen to the price if the supply were
increased and purchasing power decreased. In the current
study, they were invited to predict the direction of change
in the market price, that is, whether the price would go up
or down, if the amount of auction money was decreased from
HK$400 to HK$100 while the number of items to be auctioned
increased from six to 11.
As
noted, the learning session concluded with a five-minute
summary delivered by the researcher to remind students of
the key learning points in the computerized learning
resources. He simply read the following PowerPoint slides to
the two groups of students at the same time.
1. (Slide
1) “Compare the auction game on Days One and Two. As the
auction money given to you on Day Two was less than that on
Day One, your income decreased. When your income decreased,
your purchasing power also decreased. This made your demand
for goods decrease. As the supply of goods on Day Two was
the same as that on Day One, the average price of goods was
lower.”
2. (Slide
2) “Compare the auction game on Days Two and Three. As the
auction money given to you on Day Three was the same as that
on Day Two, your income and purchasing power remained
unchanged. Your demand for goods also remained unchanged. As
the cost of production, such as the prices of raw materials,
electricity, and labor increased, the supply of goods
decreased. As a result, the average price of goods on Day
Three was higher than that on Day Two.”
3. (Slide
3) “Compare the auction game on Days Three and Four. As the
auction money given to you was more than that that on Day
Three, your income and purchasing power increased, and your
demand for goods also increased. At the same time, the
increase in the cost of production made the supply of goods
decrease. As demand increased and supply decreased, the
average price of goods on Day Four was higher than that on
Day Three.”
4. (Slide
4) “The price of a good is determined by its supply and
demand. The supply of a good is affected by its cost of
production, such as the prices of raw materials,
electricity, and labor, whereas the demand for a good is
affected by people’s income and purchasing power. When
businesses set the price of a good, they need to consider
the factors affecting supply and demand at the same time.”
3. Results and findings
The
results presented in Table 2 show that students who belonged
to the group using the learning resource with the “same goods
design” outperformed their counterparts using the learning
resource with
the “different goods design” in the post-test, in which
statistically significant difference was observed between the
two groups (
Table 2
Distribution of conceptions, pre- and
post-test
Conception of price |
“Same goods design” Group (40 students) |
“Different goods design”
Group (38 students) |
||||||
Occurrence |
Percentage |
Occurrence |
Percentage |
|||||
Pre-test |
Post-test |
Pre-test |
Post-test |
Pre-test |
Post-test |
Pre-test |
Post-test |
|
A. Attributes of the good |
10 |
1 |
25.0% |
2.5% |
4 |
2 |
10.5% |
5.3% |
B. Demand |
14 |
11 |
35.0% |
27.5% |
14 |
15 |
36.8% |
39.5% |
C. Supply |
5 |
9 |
12.5% |
22.5% |
2 |
5 |
5.3% |
13.2% |
D. Demand and supply |
5 |
16 |
12.5% |
40.0% |
5 |
6 |
13.2% |
15.8% |
E. Other non-economic reasons |
6 |
3 |
15.0% |
7.5% |
13 |
10 |
34.2% |
26.3% |
Total |
40 |
40 |
100% |
100% |
38 |
38 |
100% |
100% |
We can see
in Table 2 that while the frequency of the target conception (D)
increased after the lesson from 5
to 16 (of 40) under conditions consistent with the conjecture,
it increased from 5 to 6 (of 40) under conditions not consistent
with the conjecture.
4. Conclusions
Only in
a restricted sense was this study a replication of Lo et al. (2005)
investigation. We wanted to find out if invariance or
variation in an unfocused aspect can really have such a strong
impact on the learning of the focused aspects as was
interpreted to be the case in the previous study. The question
could be answered in the affirmative and the conjecture was
thus supported.
It should be noted that in both the original and
follow-up studies, variation was restricted. When the supply
was invariant, demand went down (instead of going up in one
case and down in another), and when demand was invariant,
the supply went down
(instead of going up in one case and down in
another). In the
Quite a
few of the students in the comparison group managed to learn
to discern the critical features of pricing, even though the
good was not invariant. In general, even if there is variation
in several dimensions, learners may be able to block out all
dimensions but one, that on which they happen to focus. There
is an interesting twist concerning how this question appeared
in the experiment, however. As noted, in the target group, a
number of items of the same type of good were offered in each
round at the same base price. In the comparison group, the
same number of items as in the target group were offered at
the same base price. Further, whereas the target group
considered the same type of good both within and between
rounds, the comparison group considered different goods in
each round. The difference between the conditions was
illusory, however: all the relevant factors (the number of
items available, the amount of money participants had, and the
base price of goods) were exactly the same. The only element
that differed was the irrelevant labels placed on the goods.
The only thing those in the comparison group had to do was to
separate what was relevant for their decisions from what was
not, and bracket the latter. If all of them had done so, then
the conditions for the two groups would have been the same. As
we can see from the differences in outcome, however, this was
not the case. Our finding that the comparison group was
affected by the irrelevant differences in the item labels
implies that quite a few learners in that group failed to
separate relevant information from irrelevant information, and
therefore failed to see the former.
The main
contribution of this study is the support it provides for our
conjecture: if both the focused and unfocused aspects of the
object of learning vary, then it is more difficult to discern
the focused aspects and relate them to one another than if the
unfocused aspect remains invariant while the focused aspects
vary. We found this to be true in the current study, even
though the unfocused aspect was completely redundant. However,
the conjecture also addresses the question of how we can
acquire new meanings (or how we can learn to see certain
things in certain ways). As mentioned earlier, Fodor (1978,
1980), and others, claim that there is no answer to this
question and, in fact, there cannot be any. Meanings are
innate.
However,
we argue that regardless of whether meanings (concepts) are
innate, or of the sense in which they are (or are not) innate,
we have to learn to discern them as aspects of the world
around us, and for this to happen, there are necessary
conditions. These necessary conditions are specific to
particular meanings and to learners’ particular experiential
history. They can be formulated in terms of patterns of
variation and invariance among instances that do and do not
have that particular meaning. Our conjecture is thus very
straightforward, as is the way in which it can be put to the
test. We simply have to create the necessary conditions in one
case and ensure that they are absent in another, as Pang and
Marton (2003)
did in their aforementioned study. Then, we can compare the
two cases and determine whether, as expected, all participants
in the first case learn the target meaning, whereas none of
those in the second do. If these are indeed the results, then
the conjecture is strengthened.
Obviously,
this is not what happened. Even if we can demonstrate that
contrast is more powerful than induction as far as the
learning of new meanings is concerned, we cannot demonstrate
that new meanings cannot be learned through induction. After
all, some learners seem to learn in that condition too, and
certainly not all learners will learn even if all possible
steps are taken to make it possible for them to do so. The
relationship between what is learned, on the one hand, and the
conditions of learning, on the other, is stochastic rather
than deterministic. But why is this so?
Returning to the experiment reported in this paper, beyond the
fact that the target principle (price as a function of the
relationship between demand and supply) was made explicit to
both groups, there is a more general answer to the foregoing
question. Our conjecture concerns the pattern of variation and
invariance as
experienced by the learner, whereas a pattern of
variation and invariance that can be controlled by the
researcher refers to the patterns as seen by the
researcher. What might the relationship between the two
look like? One condition
of experiencing variation
is that there is variation to be experienced.
Making sure that
However,
experiencing variation not only concerns the variation to be
experienced in a relevant dimension; it also presupposes
invariance in other dimensions. In other words, variation can
be experienced only against a background of invariance. In
this sense, experienced variation is a function of invariance,
and, as previously stated, experienced variation is also a
function of variation. Our intention with the present study
was to illustrate that learning (in the sense of the
discernment of the necessary features of a phenomenon) is a
function of experienced variation (by the learner), which is a
function of both variation and invariance (as seen by the
observer). This we did, with a focus on the latter
(invariance).
We have
thus shown that introducing redundant information (different
goods) that is correlated with a variation in critical aspects
(a change in demand and supply) significantly reduces the
likelihood of learners being able to discern the critical
features of the object of learning. A seemingly subtle
difference between two conditions, both representing 90
minutes of pedagogical effort, is proved to play a key role in
what the students managed to learn.
Keypoints
Acknowledgments
The
research reported here was financially supported by the
Swedish Research Council. We also want to thank the two
reviewers of our paper for their excellent input.
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